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The purpose of this talk is twofold: (1) to briefly cover some of the highlights of a 
paper co-authored with my colleague at the Naval Postgraduate School, Daniel Moran, 
titled “The Militarization of Energy Security.”1  This is a paper published in the January 
2008 issue of our e-journal Strategic Insights and is the opening chapter in an edited 
volume that will be published by Routledge in the summer of 2008 titled: Energy 
Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management.  The volume 
includes a series of papers by a variety of authors, including the Baker Institute’s own 
Ron Soligo and Amy Jaffe, that were compiled by us at the Naval Postgraduate School as 
part of a project for the Long-Range Analysis Unit at the National Intelligence Council, 
which was preparing a national intelligence estimate on energy and national security; (2)  
I’d like offer up some thoughts of how this framework might be applied to today’s 
circumstance in international energy markets and to consider the prospect that deliberate 
actor calculations or miscalculations over the functioning or perceived non-functioning of 
those energy markets might lead to armed conflict between developed states.  
The possibility that access to energy resources may become an object of large-
scale armed struggle is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world 
system.  The political stability of advanced societies, and the continued prospects for 
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 economic and social improvement in developing countries, are both linked to the 
operation of international energy markets.  The increasing scale and complexity of these 
markets since the end of the Second World War has been one of the primary drivers of 
global economic growth.  Like all international markets, the market for energy is 
sensitive to war and upheaval, whatever the cause.  Energy markets are efficient at 
discounting risk, and there is a long history of price spikes and shortages whenever large-
scale violence, chiefly but not exclusively in oil-producing regions, threatens established 
patterns of production and consumption.  Strategic planners in the United States and 
elsewhere are well aware of the degree to which the anticipated effect of military 
operations on the price and availability of oil and natural gas needs to be considered in 
their work. 
My co-author and I asked the authors to analyze whether specific countries or 
regions of the world would “militarize” their energy security and, secondly, whether such 
a process would increase the likelihood of interstate armed conflict in response to energy 
issues.  We assembled this group of experts – drawn from economists, political scientists 
and people generally interested in security studies.  Thus we asked “guns and bombs” 
people to sit in a room with a bunch of economists, who, as rule don’t much talk to each 
other.   
Security studies people – I suppose I’m in this group – look at strategic problems 
and consider the prospect that these problems could cause actors to arrive at a decision to 
use force that would cause a generic breakdown in the international system.  Such 
prospects are generally discounted by economists, who are for the most part wedded to 
the workings of the market and stakes that all actors have in the orderly functioning of 
those markets.  These stakes represent powerful inhibitors on certain kinds of behavior, 
like war, which can in and of themselves compromise the functioning of markets upon 
which all depend.  Indeed, evidence today is on the side the economists, who point to the 
absence of armed conflict between and among developed states in the post World War II 
era as part of a general acceptance in the developed world that war just doesn’t pay.  We 
are not arguing here the world is not a violent place.  Far from it.  Warfare associated 
with state fragmentation, warlord clashes and conflict between a variety of contestants 
seeking power and influence, and attempts by the developed world to suppress actors 
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 operating outside accepted behavioral norms – all these are certainly present today.  
Setting these aside, however, it remains difficult to imagine warfare today between the 
developed states on a scale like that which existed in the World Wars – a prospect 
acknowledged in even the most alarmist of today’s strategy documents.   For example, 
one of the whole bases of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews, for example, is 
to try and re-orient the military capacities our security apparatus towards irregular 
warfare.  This is simply an acknowledgement of what I’ve described as the generally 
accepted view; that large-scale conflict between and among the developed states is 
regarded as unlikely.  
However, it is conditions in the energy sector where planners today regard it 
easiest to imagine major states reconsidering their reluctance to use force against each 
other.  “Energy Security” is now deemed so central to “national security” that threats to 
the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter.  In a world in 
which territorial disputes, ideological competition, ethnic irredentism, and even nuclear 
proliferation all seem capable of being normalized in ways that constraining the actual 
use of military forces, a crisis in global energy supplies today stands as perhaps the last 
all-weather casus belli when thinking worst case scenarios for global conflict.  
I acknowledge the bias of the security studies school of thought here, who are 
prone towards believing the worst, doubt the ability of individuals and institutions to act 
predictably in weighing the costs and benefits  in their decision-making process of 
deciding to use force, note that states have in the past taken decisions to go to war with 
their best customers, and, last, but not least, that second order effects of decisions made 
by states can produce unintended consequences that in and of themselves force changes 
in the cost-benefit calculus of states in regarding their strategic circumstances.  One of 
the celebrated instances of this latter phenomenon is the series of interactions between the 
United States and Japan that lead to the decision in the United States to freeze Japanese 
assets in June 1941, which we saw as a way to increase incremental pressure on the 
Japanese military to get them to cease their objectionable behavior in China.  The step 
resulted in a defacto oil embargo, which, while not initially realized by Roosevelt, is the 
decisive point at which the Japanese Army signs on to the Japanese Navy’s plans to go to 
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 war with the United States.   My colleague Dan Moran has done a wonderful chapter in 
the book on this case.  
The fact that strong states have been prepared to trust their energy security to the 
workings of international markets is testimony to their faith in the efficiency of those 
markets, and to their belief that the costs of war aimed at controlling energy resources 
would be so great as to outweigh the benefits.  The “militarization” of energy security 
assumes that something has changed that would cause major participants in the energy 
market to reject this calculation.  High energy prices would be a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, motivation for such a change.  In addition, governments would have to believe 
that the normal mechanisms by which prices adjust to changes in supply and demand had 
broken down, or were on their way toward doing so.  Prices in almost any market 
demonstrate three basic tendencies: short-term volatility, medium-term momentum, and 
long-term reversion to the mean.  The meaning of these terms varies depending on what 
is being bought and sold, but their operation is apparent across an enormous range of 
economic phenomena.  They represent, collectively, the self-modulating action of supply 
and demand, which is the economist’s equivalent of the Law of Gravity. 
From the point of view of those who seek to make money in a marketplace, the 
first two tendencies – volatility and momentum – are of the greatest interest, since it is by 
mastering these that one has the best chance to “buy low, sell high.”  For strategists, 
however, it is “mean reversion” that matters most, since it is this longer-term mechanism 
that provides reassurance during periods when volatility and momentum carry prices and 
supplies to uncomfortably high or low levels.  Mean reversion does not require that prices 
fluctuate in perpetuity around a flat line, simply that their aggregate movement describe a 
relatively smooth trend, which may have a positive or negative slope, but whose variance 
is markedly less great than that displayed by short- and mid-term price changes.  Such 
relationships are no more than mathematical models, which can be calculated in different 
ways.  But for our purposes it is not the precise calculation but the general idea that 
matters, and specifically the military and political consequences that might follow if this 
general idea is abandoned. 
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 The first task of a project designed to consider the militarization of energy 
security must be to identify the kinds of events or forces that would cause governments to 
conclude that energy prices or supplies will not revert to some established trend.  Such 
events need not be dramatic in themselves.  It is most likely that the militarization of 
energy security will occur as a series of small calculations (or miscalculations) conceived 
in response to limited crises or opportunities; each of which will, however, erode the 
willingness of other participants to trust the market going forward.  To speak of the 
militarization of energy security, it is necessary to imagine that such activity reaches a 
scale at which the normal operation of energy markets is compromised.  The scenarios 
that interest us need not go so far as to hypothesize “the end of history” (a phrase with a 
long history in itself…); but they must envision strategic intervention on a scale that is 
not incidental, but calls into question the future vitality of the market as a whole. 
Strategic action with respect to energy may take a wide range of forms.  A 
representative and by no means complete list of possibilities would include: 
1. Direct seizure of energy assets by military means. 
2. Military confrontation arising from competitive efforts to identify and exploit 
new energy resources 
a. on the high seas, where legal claims of sovereignty are absent; 
b. in archipelagic regions like Southeast Asia, where they are routinely 
contested; or 
c. in Antarctica, where they are subject to a treaty regime whose 
resilience has never been seriously tested. 
3. Indirect control of energy assets through the creation of puppet states. 
4. Military overthrow of governments whose outlook or conduct are deemed 
inimical to the functioning of energy markets. 
5. Military protection of (or attacks upon) the energy production and 
transportation infrastructure, including oil fields, refineries, pipelines, port 
facilities, etc. 
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 6. Protection of (or attacks upon) international straits and archipelagic waters 
through which energy assets move. 
7. Intervention to defend governments of energy-producing states against 
internal upheaval, on terms that incite suspicion among other market 
participants. 
8. The development of exclusive energy trading blocs based upon commitments 
of mutual defense, and reminiscent of the systems of “imperial preference” 
that existed before 1945. 
9. The conveyance of major military assets to regional energy producers in 
exchange for preferential market treatment, or with a view to enabling them to 
impose themselves upon neighboring states. 
 
Our paper spins out some of these arguments in greater detail, but I think it’s 
useful for discussion purposes here to perhaps point to some recent events which point if 
not to outright militarization point to questions about the ability of the energy market to 
function in the future as they have in the past – delivering predictable supplies, with 
supply and demand in lock step, and, perhaps most important, markets delivering the 
means reversion that provides solace and comfort for the economists and strategists alike.   
It would be remiss, however, not to mention that there are those that argue that the 
phenomenon of militarization of energy is in fact well underway. This historian Andrew 
Bacevich did a piece several years ago for the Wilson Quarterly titled “The Real World 
War IV,”2 in which he argued that President Carter’s threat to use nuclear weapons to 
defend the Gulf against outside powers touched off a sequence of actions that saw the 
United States consciously mobilize its military to protect the region’s oil fields.  More 
recently, Michael Klare – a chapter contributor to our book – argues in a recent piece in 
The Nation that energy and security calculations have provided an important impetus for 
our [the U.S.] continued emphasis on building carrier strike groups in the Navy’s 
desperate quest to justify a hugely expensive multi-billion dollar shipbuilding program at 
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 a time when most countries around the world have given up on the idea of having any 
kind of Navy outside a few vessels for coastal patrol.3  
The Politics – Market Gap 
 I would argue that the framework for analysis suggested by our concept of 
militarization is of interest in today’s circumstance in several contexts.  First, there is a 
growing perception around the world that international energy markets are no longer 
functioning in accordance with two “iron laws of the marketplace.”  The first of these is 
that rising prices provides a brake on demand and, concurrently, stimulate the 
development of additional supplies.  As Fatih Birol, chief economist at the International 
Energy Agency, recently commented in the New York Times, “According to normal 
economic theory, and the history of oil, rising prices have two major effects.  They 
reduce demand and induce oil supplies.  Not this time.”  Demand for oil keeps increasing 
– forecasted to grow by another 1.2 million barrels per day in 2008 to reach an estimated 
87.2 million barrels per day.  Moreover, there’s just no way to get around the fact that 
non-OPEC suppliers have plateaued and will cease to be able to significantly increase 
production.  We look to the Saudis to increase production, but they have only committed 
increasing production to 12.5 million barrels a day – far short of what projections say will 
be necessary to keep supply and demand in any kind of reasonable balance.  In short we 
are entering a period of resource scarcity – for a variety of reasons, which have mostly to 
do with capacity in the industry which is simply unprepared to deal with the rate of 
demand increase over the last five years. 
 The second feature of the market suggesting a “compromise” in function is that 
nobody anywhere is suggesting that the price of energy is going down any time soon.  
Jeff Rubin an analyst at CIBC World Markets suggested recently in the New York Times 
that we are entering a period of “unprecedented scarcity” that could produce $200 per 
barrel oil and $7 a gallon gasoline here in the United States -- to say nothing of what it 
might cost in Europe.  What does this mean? In other words, there is no “mean reversion” 
coming, that will see pricing revert to historical norms.  The “mean reversion” reverts 
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 inexorably upward, creating the specter of the “haves” and “have nots” on the consuming 
side of the equation relative to their ability to pay these prices.  
Why are these two points relevant to the concept of militarization? First, it is 
these circumstances which indicate to us that there are growing perceptions that the 
market is already operating outside expected behavioral norms, suggesting that the 
functioning of markets is in fact already compromised.  Second, that if states reach the 
conclusion that markets have ceased operating in accordance with generally accepted 
principles, they lose confidence in those markets to deliver in the present and in the future 
as they have in the past.  Once this cognitive hurdle is leapt over, all bets are off, as states 
reassess – indeed take a more alarming view – of the ways in which these compromised 
markets are not operating to their benefit and are in instead creating strategic 
circumstances that redound inexorably to their detriment.  This creates the classic 
circumstance that security studies experts refer to as “preventative war,” in which states 
perceive that their strategic circumstances get inexorably worse over time, thereby 
weighting the costs in favor of taking military action to improve their prospects. 
 Nowhere are these considerations more important than the United States, which is 
perhaps alone in the world with a military that might be able to intercede unilaterally and 
on a scale that would systematically affect energy markets.  I should parenthetically note 
that I doubt the capacities of violent non-state actors to achieve anything other than 
episodic affect on energy markets.  But it is ironic to mention the United States in such a 
context, since one could argue that there is no country in the world today more 
ideologically and politically committed – even militarily committed – to the functioning 
of world markets.  While the US military presence in the Gulf is cited by many as an 
attempt to “take over” the region’s oil fields, I’d be among those arguing that we are 
using force to protect the orderly functioning of markets for all – including us.  This is 
unsurprising, cine the United States and its $12+ trillion GDP has by far the largest 
global stake in the orderly functioning of these markets.  
 Having said that, however, I would also argue that we in the United States are 
concurrently blinded to the truly strategic dimensions of the impact that world energy 
markets have had on global financial plate tectonics over the last five years.  While 
thousands of US and Iraqis were killed in the Iraq war and the American taxpayers were 
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 saddled with a $1 trillion plus in additional debt, allowing the Gulf States to became a 
global economic superpower courtesy of world energy markets.  And they promise to get 
a lot richer – unbelievably richer: 
 
• GCC GDP has grown from $406 billion in 2003 to $712 billion in 2006; the 
IMF estimates that GCC GDP could reach $883 billion in 2008. 
• GCC annual export earnings more than doubled from 2001-2006, from $146 
billion in the preceding five years to $327 billion. 
• Morgan Stanley estimates Gulf “above ground” wealth now at $44 trillion, three 
times US GDP and almost as much as the total world GDP (est. $48 trillion in 
2006) 
• By the end of 2007, GCC sovereign wealth funds were managing over $1 
trillion in assets. Add $460 billion w/the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency and 
estimated private holdings and the investment portfolio in the Gulf now totals 
$2 trillion. 
• GCC dollar holdings are now estimated at $1 trillion – more than Japan, second 
only to China. 
• The next time you hear someone pontificating about the new era of pax Iran in 
the Gulf, consider that Tehran has lost the economic competition with the GCC.  
The GCC bow wave has broken over them the same way it has broken over us, 
but, like the Iranians, we don’t get it.  When I say “we,” I mean our politicians 
and public.  My guess is that Robert Rubin at Citigroup gets it.  The UBS 
leadership in Switzerland gets it.  Officials at GE Plastics get it. 
Political Reactions and Plate Tectonics 
 There is today a chasm in the United States in what I would argue are the general 
public and political domains over the changes in global plate tectonics that have been 
unleashed by the apparently orderly functioning of energy markets over the last 5 years.  
An argument can be made that ignorance surrounding the effects of these markets is as 
capable of producing the same kinds of miscalculations in the United States as those that 
existed in Japan in the 1930s. 
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  What I’m suggesting here is that once our politicians wake up and realize what 
has happened and what will continue to happen, they’re not going to like it.  And, let’s 
face it; there are members of our political establishment that just don’t like the fact that 
Gulf Arabs are accumulating wealth at such a rapid rate.  They don’t like the prospect of 
wandering through these capitals, cap in hand, apologizing for past misdeeds and asking 
for help in the latest economic crisis du jure.  And, they are not sure they like the prospect 
of $7 a gallon gasoline by 2012 that promises to change the American way of life while 
the Gulf State Arabs are building underwater hotels and indoor ski slopes and manmade 
islands for the hyper wealthy.  Last, they’re not going to want to explain all this to the 
American people by urging them to look in the mirror, tighten their belts, and start riding 
their bikes to work.  Just look at Obama and Clinton wandering through the rust belt 
mindlessly blaming people’s economic problems on those bad free trade deals.  A 
precursor of what could come on a grander scale?  I’m not sure, but I am convinced – as 
Fareed Zakaria argued in his excellent Foreign Affairs piece – that our political system 
has become all but incapable of addressing these and other systemic problems.4 
 Other recent events provide examples of what I would argue are ominous 
indicators of how far behind the curve of self realization we in the United States are at 
this point.  First, the Israeli lobby got Senator Schumer to introduce a bill threatening not 
to sell our arms to those bad old Saudis unless they increase oil production.  Wow.  I bet 
the Al Saud are quaking in their boots.  Imagine that – we might not sell them some more 
F-15s as a sign of how displeased we are with them.  Second, we’ve had an American 
president twice dismissed from Riyadh in the last six months – actually, laughed out of 
town in the regional press.  I submit that the next time a president goes to Riyadh or any 
of the oil-rich GCC capitals; he or she will enter on their knees begging for their 
business. 
 In other words, we don’t get it.  We don’t get the fact that markets and market 
functions change political realities and change the political calculations of actors about 
the relative distribution of power in the international system.  I have news for you – that 
distribution is changing and has already changed in ways that reduce American’s 
leverage around the world.  We don’t have the same kind of leverage we once had in 
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Riyadh.  We’ve squandered it – foolishly.  But we don’t understand it. Instead, we’re 
now in some kind of parallel universe, where Alfred E. Neumann’s plaintive “what me 
worry” slogan seems to characterize the political and public outlook. 
 But sooner or later, the chasm in perception that that exists today will close.  The 
public and our politicians will wake up and realize that the global financial center of 
gravity has shifted to the oil producing states in the Gulf.  And when that happens, I fear 
the prospect of militarization will rear its ugly head. 
Conclusion 
1. War happens through a combination of stupidity, irrationality and miscalculation.  
But the fact that conflict between developed states hasn’t happened since the end 
of World War II doesn’t mean it won’t happen again.  Calculations over energy 
are not immune to these considerations or the iron logic of preventative war. 
2. Normal functioning of international energy markets may already be compromised.  
Even if they are not – there is a growing perception that this has in fact happened.  
Increased prices are not acting as a brake on demand and stimulating new 
supplies, as the economic theory suggests it should.  Perhaps more importantly, 
the future may not be like the past insofar as world energy markets are concerned 
in that the market may not deliver the “mean reversion” of pricing.  Instead, the 
mean reversion reverts on an upward path – a path that must inevitably shape the 
cost/benefit calculus of participants in the market. 
3. The perceptive chasm in the United States between new market realities and their 
impact of the global distribution of power will one day close – and when it does, 
look out.  It’s not so far fetched to suggest the creation of a toxic mix of ugly 
domestic circumstance, bad leadership, and plain stupidity that all cast 
militarization as a useful option to restore “logic” to a systemically compromised 
market.” 
 
